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      講座:Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing with Asymmetric Information: Implications for Horizontal Mergers

      發布者:人力資源辦公室    發布時間:2020-12-13

      題 目:Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing with Asymmetric Information: Implications for Horizontal Mergers

      嘉 賓:陶學臻 助理教授 上海財經大學

      主持人:李淑雯 助理教授 上海交通大學安泰經濟與管理學院

      時 間:2020年 12月18日(周五) 14:00-15:30

      地 點:上海交通大學 徐匯校區安泰樓B404



      Almost all empirical models of competition in differentiated product markets assume that firms have complete information and set prices to maximize current profits. Building on a small theoretical literature, we develop a dynamic model where each firm has private information about a serially-correlated state variable, such as its marginal cost, and sets its price to signal information to rivals. We find that even limited amounts of private information can raise equilibrium prices significantly, and that failing to account for signaling effects can lead conventional merger simulation calculations to substantially underpredict post-merger price increases. We structurally estimate our model using data from the beer industry and find that our model predicts observed changes in price levels and price dynamics following the 2008 MillerCoors joint venture.


      Dr. Xuezhen Tao is an assistant professor of economics in College of Business, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. Dr. Tao’s research is focused on information asymmetry, product innovation and moral hazard with applications in industries like beer, smartphone, and medical suppliance. Before joining SUFE, Dr. Tao received a Ph.D. in Economics from University of Maryland.